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BEARD V. BANKS:
RESTRICTED READING, REHABILITATION,
AND PRISONERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
Anna C. Burns*
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does
not lose his human quality; his mind does not become
closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a
free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for
self-respect does not end; nor is his quest for selfrealization concluded . . . It is the role of the First
Amendment and this Court to protect those precious
personal rights by which we satisfy such basic yearnings
of the human spirit. 1
INTRODUCTION
Punishment, sentencing, prison: the very act of removing an
individual from society implies deprivation. 2 Though prisoners
may be subject to regulation, they do not lose their basic human
rights. Based upon years of prisoners’ challenges to regulation
of their First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has
*
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The author wishes to thank her family, Mary Jane, Leslie, and Laurel Burns,
as well as Benjamin Godsill, for their love and support throughout law
school. She would also like to thank her close friends for constant
encouragement, and the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their
editorial help.
1
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 104 (1989).
2
Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
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developed a framework to review such challenges, equally
respectful of the goals of prison administration and the
preservation of rights. As most recently applied in Beard v.
Banks, however, the framework loses sight of this balance,
suggesting that prisoners may ultimately be deprived of future
protection.
Deprivation of prisoners’ First Amendment freedoms was
first analyzed by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, 3
a case involving personal correspondence between inmates and
the underlying administrative censorship procedures to maintain
safety. 4 While stressing the importance of the freedom to
communicate, the Court noted that “some latitude is . . .
essential to the proper discharge of an administrator’s duty. But
any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence
must be generally necessary to protect one or more . . .
legitimate governmental interests.” 5
Then, in 1987, in Turner v. Safley, 6 the Supreme Court
provided a more in-depth analysis of its standard of review,
noting that if a “prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.”7 Furthermore, the
Court established a four-factor test, looking towards (1)
rationality, (2) whether any alternatives remained open to
prisoners, (3) the impact of the freedom on the general prison
population, and (4) whether there was a less restrictive
alternative. 8
While the Turner structure has been successfully applied in
cases involving censorship or deprivation of letters, 9 contentspecific newspapers or magazines, 10 literature discussing

3

Procunier, 416 U.S. 396.
Id.
5
Id. at 414.
6
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
7
Id. at 89.
8
Id. at 89-91.
9
Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166 (1987).
10
Id.
4
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sexuality, 11 and regulation of visitors to prisons, 12 all of these
cases hinged upon the importance of maintaining order and
security within the prison system. As Turner illustrated, if the
censorship or limitation is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests, then claims of safety have found both
support and deference in the courts. 13
However, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Beard v.
Banks 14 presents a question as to the continuing validity of the
Turner test. In Banks, inmates in the “most restrictive level” of
a Pennsylvania prison were not allowed access to newspapers,
magazines, or personal photographs. 15 All inmates in the prison
were initially placed in this most restrictive level and therefore
deprived of access to these items upon arrival. 16 Although some
inmates eventually progressed into a less restrictive area of the
prison, “in practice most [did] not.” 17 That is, most prisoners
continued to face severe restrictions on their access to visitors,
phone calls, and commissary, 18 and were additionally denied
access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs. 19
Reviewing the justification of the regulation, the Supreme
Court relied on the Pennsylvania Prison Secretary’s belief that
such deprivation was necessary “to motivate better behavior on
the part of [these] particularly difficult prisoners, by providing
them with an incentive” 20 to change levels in the prison, and to
“discourage backsliding.” 21 Not wanting to appear as if it were
11

Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2005).
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
13
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91-93 (1987).
14
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
15
Id. at 2575.
16
See id. at 2576.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. These limitations should be viewed in concert with the denial of
prisoner access to television and radio in all levels of LTSU as well as within
other units of the prison. Id.
20
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2578-79 (2006).
21
Id. at 2579 (citing Brief of Appellant at 26, Beard v. Banks, 126 S.
Ct. 2572 (2006)).
12
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deferring to administrators without applying the balancing test,
the Court danced through the Turner analysis with decidedly
little interest. Accepting the musings of prison officials as fact,
the Court found the regulations necessary and reasonable. Yet,
because the justification was rehabilitation, the Court’s use of
the Turner test appeared “poorly suited” to the task, unable to
strike a real balance between deprivation and constitutional
freedoms. 22
The limitation was upheld. Deferential review paved the way
for the approval of a restriction which imposes severe limits on
prisoners’ First Amendment freedoms—limits conditioned solely
upon incarceration and which are likely to continue for the term
of a sentence. 23 While the administrators’ goals of maintaining
control over prisoner behavior, minimizing property in cells,
and ensuring safety 24 are logical and rational, it does not
automatically follow that the restrictions on access to
newspapers, magazines and personal photographs are reasonably
related or tailored to those goals. 25 The Court, however,
accepted the goal of rehabilitation without acknowledging the
faulty tailoring.
Part I of this Comment examines the development of the
Turner test and its importance in evaluating challenges to
deprivation of prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Part II
illustrates successful application of the test in various First
Amendment cases involving prisoner access to certain writing
and reading materials. Part III then addresses the specifics of
Beard v. Banks, focusing on the misapplication of the Turner
test. Finally, Part IV explores the policy implications of Banks,
addressing the deprivation/rehabilitation theory espoused by the
prison officials, and concludes with a call for greater scrutiny in
the courts, as well as local action on the part of legislators and
prison administrators, to ensure the preservation of prisoners’
fundamental rights.
22
23
24
25

Id. at 2584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 2576.
Id. at 2578.
Id. at 2586-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURNER TEST
This Part examines the foundational case law of prisoners’
First Amendment rights and the evolution of the Turner test.
Section A considers Procunier v. Martinez, 26 the inaugural case
involving prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Section B
examines Procunier’s progeny, a line of cases emphasizing the
need for alternative means of expression and the importance of
deferential review. Finally, Section C reviews Turner and
frames the resulting four-part test. This section concludes with a
discussion of Justice Stevens’ dissent, suggesting that the Turner
standard is not as reliable or well-crafted as the majority
assumed.
A. First Amendment Prisoner Rights in Procunier v.
Martinez 27
The Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment rights
of prisoners in the 1974 case of Procunier v. Martinez. 28 In
Procunier, prisoners challenged state prison policies regarding
censorship and monitoring of inmate correspondence. Certain
prison regulations prohibited inmates from “writ[ing] letters in
which
they
‘unduly
complain[ed]’
or
‘magnif[ied]
29
grievances,’” or expressing “inflammatory political, racial,
religious or other views or beliefs. . .,” 30 as well as discussing
criminal mischief, or “otherwise inappropriate” items. 31 Where
enforcement was concerned, however, there was little guidance
for prison officials as to how the inmate correspondence should

26

416 U.S. 396 (1974).
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 399 (citing California Department of Corrections Director’s
Rule 1201).
30
Id. (citing California Department of Corrections Director’s Rule
1205).
31
Id. at 400 (citing California Department of Corrections Director’s
Rule 2402(8)).
27
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be reviewed. 32
Articulating the first standard of review for limitations on
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court
expressed some hesitation about intruding into the realm of
prison administration. 33 However, the Court made it clear that
consistency was desperately needed to define the permissible
reach of judicial review within the prison system. 34 Addressing
the issue of censorship in a broader context, the Court looked
not only at the denial of the prisoners’ right of free expression
under the First Amendment, but also at the effect of the denial
on those with whom the inmate was corresponding. 35 Drawing
on a previous First Amendment case, 36 the Court articulated a
new two-part analysis for cases specifically dealing with
32

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 400 (1974).
Id. at 404.
34
Id. at 406-08.
35
Id. at 408-10.
36
The previous First Amendment case referred to is United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O’Brien involved governmental restrictions on
free speech. O’Brien burned his selective service registration certificate on
courthouse steps in demonstration of his feelings toward the military draft and
the Vietnam War. In addressing O’Brien’s actions, the Court noted that even
though O’Brien was using free expression, the First Amendment did not act
as an ultimate shield allowing all behaviors. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
Realizing that government regulations would inevitably touch free
speech and the First Amendment from time to time, the court created a fourpart test to review such restrictions. Id. at 376-78. First, the restriction may
be sufficiently justified if it is within the government’s power. Id. Second,
the restriction will have support if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest. Id. Third, the restriction should not be related to the
suppression of expression. Id. Finally, the restriction should be no greater
than is necessary to accomplish the governmental objective. Id.
Reviewing O’Brien within the context of Procunier, the Supreme Court
emphasized that Procunier also involved governmental regulations, unrelated
to the suppression of expression, but that impinged on First Amendment
rights nonetheless. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 410-14. Recognizing that the test
in O’Brien was best suited for situations in which individuals were not
constrained or isolated from society, the court then formulated a new test in
Procunier based loosely on two of the important factors in O’Brien. Id. at
413-14.
33
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suppression of prisoners’ freedom of expression. 37 First, any
restriction imposed by prison officials must “further an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression. . .” and second, the limitation may
not extend too far, but rather, must be only what is “necessary
or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved.” 38 The Court noted that the regulations
provided no guidance to prison officials concerning how or what
to look for in censoring correspondence, and that there was little
justification for the furtherance of any penological interest. 39
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the invalidation of the
regulations. 40
B. The Lead-Up to Turner
Over the next decade, armed with the Procunier framework,
the Court addressed a variety of inmates’ First Amendment
cases. Beginning with Pell v. Procunier, 41 the Court began to
view the presence of alternative means of expression with
heightened importance. Similarly, deference to prison
administrators who dealt with inmates on a day-to-day basis
weighed more heavily in the analysis. In the following section,
the cases of Pell, Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 42 Bell v.
Wolfish, 43 and Block v. Rutherford, 44 illustrate the evolution of
Procunier, culminating in the Turner framework.

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413-14.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974).
Id. at 415-16.
Id.
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
468 U.S. 576 (1984).
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1. Pell v. Procunier—1974

In Pell v. Procunier, the Supreme Court addressed prisoners’
claims that regulations prohibiting them from engaging in faceto-face media interviews amounted to an unlawful infringement
on their freedom of expression. 45 Under the first prong of
Procunier, the Court noted that limiting visits from strangers
was clearly related to important governmental interests of prison
safety, deterrence of crime, and rehabilitation. 46 Indeed, all
three interests were threatened when strangers were allowed
face-to-face contact with inmates, as such visits often led to
disciplinary problems. 47
Addressing the second Procunier factor, narrow tailoring of
the restriction, the Court in Pell reasoned that the limitation of
expression in face-to-face media interviews should not be
assessed in an isolated context, but instead viewed in connection
with possible alternative forms of expression available to
inmates. 48 It was clear to the Court that alternatives did exist.
Because inmates were able to express their views through the
mail and personal visits with friends and family, they had not
been totally deprived or censored in their expression. 49 Indeed,
the Court noted that “although [security concerns] would not
permit prison officials to prohibit all expression or
communication by prison inmates, security considerations are
sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison to
justify the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of
outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with inmates.” 50
The analysis in Pell, therefore, added a third factor to be
considered alongside the two articulated in Procunier, namely,

45
46
47
48
49
50

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 824-25.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
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the availability of alternatives to prisoners. 51
2. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union—1977
The Procunier test was again applied in Jones v. N.C
Prisoners’ Labor Union. 52 At issue were regulations prohibiting
inmates from joining or meeting as a prison union, and
forbidding the delivery of packets sent to inmates from outside
union organizers. 53 Emphasizing the realities of operating a
prison system, the Court looked to Procunier and the importance
of affording deference to prison officials. 54 Under the first prong
of Procunier, the Court addressed the importance of the
governmental interest involved. Relying on correctional officers’
testimony that prisoner unions created added tension between
prisoners and prison officials and increased the likelihood of
riots, work stoppages, and misuse of influence amongst other
prisoners, 55 the Court noted that “the ban on inmate solicitation
and group meetings . . . was rationally related to the reasonable,
indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration.” 56
Regarding the prohibition against bulk mailing from outside
union organizers, 57 under the second prong of Procunier, the
Court recognized that the prohibition limited prisoners’ First
Amendment rights. However, it reasoned that although bulk
mailing was restricted, there were alternative means by which
outside union organizers could communicate with prisoners. 58
Again, as in Pell, the need for alternative forms of expression
was emphasized. So long as the prison was not limiting all
avenues of communication between prisoners and outside union
organizers, then the restriction on bulk mailing did not go too

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 823.
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130-31.
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 130-31 (1977).
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far in the context of the second prong of Procunier. 59
The Court then turned to the restrictions on “inmate-toinmate solicitation of membership [in unions],” 60 and the
prohibition on prisoner union meetings. Here, unlike the
restriction on bulk mailings, the Court did not find a violation of
prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 61 Instead, the Court noted
the importance of the government interest involved—the need for
prison management and organization—and concluded that
“numerous associational rights are necessarily curtailed by the
realities of confinement.” 62 Prisoners’ unions would no doubt
create difficulties for prison officials in maintaining order and
peace among inmates. 63 The Court found these to be reasonable
objectives under Procunier, concluding “the regulations [were]
drafted no more broadly than they [needed] to be to combat the
perceived threat stemming directly from group meetings and
organizational activities of the Union.” 64 Jones thus represents a
clear application of the Procunier test, while also highlighting
the need for alternative means of expression when prisoners’
First Amendment rights are infringed.
3. Bell v. Wolfish—1979
Straightforward application of Procunier and an emphasis on
alternative means of expression is also illustrated by Bell v.
Wolfish, a case involving restrictions placed on pre-trial
detainees’ receipt of, among other things, hardcover books. 65
59

Id.
Id. at 131.
61
Id. at 131-32.
62
Id. at 132.
63
Id.
64
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 133 (1977).
65
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979). Generally, prison officials
were concerned about security and administrative issues when inmates
received bound items from individuals outside of prison. Id. at 549.
Hardcover books posed a specific problem as, before they would be
distributed to inmates, prison officials would need to ensure that the books
did not contain drugs, money, or weapons. Id. This in turn required a
60
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Specifically, pre-trial detainees were subject to a “publisheronly” rule, and only allowed to receive books and magazines
mailed directly from an outside publisher or bookstore. 66 Under
the first part of Procunier, the Court referred to the prison
warden’s affidavit that “‘serious’ security and administrative
problems were caused when bound items were received by
inmates from unidentified sources outside the facility.” 67 As the
mailing of books (particularly hardcover) from outside
individuals increased the possibility that contraband could be
smuggled into the prison, the Court affirmed the restriction as
rational. 68
Reviewing the second Procunier requirement, the Court
noted that the specific limitation on hardcover books did not
appear overly broad, 69 and concluded that “the considered
judgment of [prison officials] must control in the absence of
prohibitions far more sweeping than those involved here.” 70 The
Court also emphasized that ready alternatives existed for inmates
to access reading materials: books and magazines could be sent
directly from publishers, bookstores, or book clubs, 71 and
inmates also had access to the correctional center’s library of
over 3,000 hardcover and 5,000 paperback books. 72 Applying
Procunier to the restriction at issue, the Court found legitimate
reasons for the restriction as well as several alternatives for
prisoners’ First Amendment expression.

thorough search of the books, where the covers would be removed and the
pages individually leafed through. Id.
66
Id. at 548-49. The prison officials reasoned that the burden of leafing
through pages and removing book covers would not be necessary if books
were sent directly by the publishers, as there would be an extremely low
probability that a publisher would send contraband. Id. at 549.
67
Id. at 549.
68
Id. at 550-51.
69
Id. at 551.
70
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 552 (1979).
71
Id. at 551.
72
Id. at 552 n.33.
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4. Block v. Rutherford—1984

Block v. Rutherford, like Bell, also involved claims brought
by pre-trial detainees, 73 and further changed the landscape of
Procunier by re-framing the first prong of the test. Rutherford
involved a ban on contact visits for pre-trial detainees, which the
detainees argued constituted a violation of their due process
rights. 74 Instead of asking whether the regulation furthered an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression, the Court inquired only as to whether
the prohibition was “reasonably related to the security of the
facility” as justified by the prison administration. 75 Refusing to
delve too far into the rationale behind the restriction, the Court
found it obvious that contact visits created the potential for
internal security problems. 76
The Court next turned to an analysis under the second prong
of Procunier. Unlike the courts below, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that the restriction was impermissibly excessive
in relation to the security concerns proffered by the prison
administrators. 77 Focusing instead on the difficulty of functional
73

Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
Id. at 578. Specifically, the pre-trial detainees were prohibited from
touching spouses, relatives, and friends. Id. The detainees were, however,
permitted “unmonitored non-contact visits” for twelve hours a day. Id. These
non-contact visits involved an inmate sitting on one side of a clear glass
panel, with the visitor on the other side. Id. The parties were able to
communicate through a telephone but could not physically touch. Id.
75
Id. at 586.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 587. In addressing the detainees’ claims regarding visitation
restrictions, the district court had recognized that “to allow unrestricted
contact visitation would add greatly to the Sheriff’s security problems and
reduce the number of allowable visits. On the other hand, it is equally
obvious that the ability of a man to embrace his wife and his children from
time to time during the weeks or months while he is awaiting trial is a matter
of great importance to him.” 457 F. Supp. 104, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The
district court went on to emphasize the importance of evaluating prisoners
when they first arrive, and classifying the prisoners accordingly. Id. Those
prisoners that presented the greatest security threats could indeed be denied
74
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alternatives and the resulting burdens on administrators, the
Court dismissed the need to use less restrictive means. 78
Specifically, the Court noted that the “burdens of identifying
candidates for contact visitation. . . [were] made even more
difficult by the brevity of detention and the constantly changing
nature of the inmate population.”79 Furthermore, there was great
potential for problems if certain detainees were allowed visits
while others were denied the same privileges. 80 The Court
concluded that the “blanket prohibition” on contact visits was
“an entirely reasonable, non-punitive response to the legitimate
security concerns identified.” 81 Thus, unlike Pell, Jones, and
Bell, the Court did not hesitate to uphold the restriction even
though it affected all prisoners uniformly and failed to provide
any alternative means of visitation. Instead, under the second
prong of Procunier, the Court justified the limitation as only
going as far as necessary to protect prison safety. 82
Examination of Pell, Jones, and Bell illustrates the
importance of deference to prison officials, while also
highlighting the Court’s retreat from the idea that alternative
means of expression are always required. Taken together, these
cases suggest that if a restriction is necessary and essential to
protect penological interests, it may be deemed valid even if no
visitation for safety reasons. Id. However, for those low-risk inmates, the
court reasoned it would be proper to allow one visit per week. Id. The goal
was to treat “inmates with reasonable humanity without unduly increasing the
problems of security.” Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s analysis, noting
that “the institution’s security interests do not always predominate. A blanket
restriction on contact visits for all detainees may present an unreasonable,
exaggerated response to security concerns at a particular facility.” 710 F.2d
572, 577 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit approved of the district court’s
order for minimal visits, noting that if the prisoners did not raise security
concerns, then there would be no sense in depriving them of contact visits.
Id.
78
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587-88 (1984).
79
Id. at 587.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 588.
82
Id.
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alternative means of expression are available.
C. Turner v. Safley 83
By 1987, the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts across
the country, had dealt with numerous cases involving the
restriction of prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 84 Turner v.
Safley represented an important shift in the Court’s analysis of
such cases, and resulted in a new framework, replacing that of
Procunier.
In Turner, prisoners brought two challenges to prison
regulations: one dealing with First Amendment rights, the other
concerning the constitutional right to marry. 85 Specifically,
prison regulations prohibited inmates from corresponding with

83

482 U.S. 78 (1987).
See infra Parts IA and IB, with reference to Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974) (holding that correspondence between inmates can be
limited); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (finding face-to-face media
interviews were permissibly limited); Jones v. N.C. Carolina Prisoners’
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding ban on prison inmate solicitation and
sending of bulk packages); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding
restriction that inmates may only receive books and magazines mailed directly
from publishers); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (holding contact
visits for pre-trial detainees can be limited). See also, Abdul Wali v.
Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding prisons cannot deny
prisoners access in receiving reports on prison conditions without justification
of penological interests); Shabazz v. O’Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding prisons cannot restrict prisoners from attending weekly religious
services unless prison shows that restriction serves important security
purposes); Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding prison
may prohibit correspondence between prisoners); Taylor v. Sternett, 532
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding prison officials may not open inmates’
correspondence with attorneys, probation officers, governmental agencies,
and the press unless there is a reasonable possibility that contraband is
included in the mail); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976)
(finding regulation that prohibits prisoners’ from having any photographs or
paintings of nudes is impermissibly broad); United States v. Baumgarten, 517
F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1975) (screening inmates’ mail is permissible if
regulation is for security purposes and goes no further than necessary).
85
See generally, Turner, 482 U.S. 78.
84
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one another, and banned inmate marriages in the absence of
prior prison approval. 86 Confirming the prisoners’ right under
Procunier to petition for review of the letter-writing restrictions,
Justice O’Connor noted that “prison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.” 87 However, in the same breath, the Court
emphasized the importance of cautious judicial review of prison
regulations. 88
Before proceeding to examine the regulations at issue, the
Court articulated a more exacting standard of review than the
one first pronounced in Procunier, holding that “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” 89 The Court then laid out a four-part test
to be used in analyzing the regulation, its impacts, and possible
alternatives.
First, addressing the need for logic and objectivity, there
must be “a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward.” 90 Additionally, the Court acknowledged that Pell 91
and Bell 92 required that the asserted penological interest be
neutral and objective, and not content based. 93
Second, the Court noted that the existence of alternative
forms of expression for prisoners should also be considered in
assessing the deprivation of rights. 94 Because regulations and
restrictions should not be viewed in isolation, if one mode of
86

Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 84.
88
Id. at 85.
89
Id. at 89.
90
Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
91
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974).
92
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551 (1979).
93
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
94
Id. at 90. The Court focused on Pell’s contribution to this idea of
alternative channels of expression. If there were indeed “other avenues” for
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, then reviewing courts should be more
deferential to prison officials. Id. (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827).
87
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expression was limited in order to advance valid interests, it was
necessary to determine what other options remained open,
suggesting the importance of deference while recognizing the
need to protect prisoners from total deprivation. 95
Third, the Court found it necessary to analyze the difficulties
a prison would face were it forced to provide the freedom
requested by the inmate. 96 Potential effects on prison
administration, officials, the implication for other inmates, and
the stated goals of the regulation were all considered. 97
Finally, the fourth Turner factor focused on whether there
were less restrictive alternatives that would accomplish the same
objectives. 98 If equally effective alternatives exist, there is a
presumption that the chosen restriction constitutes an unlawful
“exaggerated response.” 99 The Court noted, however, that the
burden of showing a less restrictive alternative falls on the
prisoner rather than officials. 100 Furthermore, the Court
cautioned that the fourth factor should not be viewed as a “least
restrictive alternative test.” 101 Rather, if an inmate were to
present a workable alternative that satisfied the goal while also
accommodating First Amendment rights “at de minimis cost,” it
could indicate that the regulation was not truly reasonable. 102
Applying the newly articulated four-part test to the facts of
Turner, the Court first addressed the limitation on
correspondence with inmates at other prisons. 103 Searching for a
rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate
95

Id.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 90-91.
99
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 90 (1987).
100
Id. at 91.
101
Id. at 90-91. It appears the Court was concerned that a test requiring
the least restrictive alternative would place too much of a procedural burden
on prison administrators, and so emphasized that review of regulations should
not require an administrator to “set up and then shoot down every
conceivable alternative method of accomoda[tion].” Id.
102
Id. at 90-91.
103
Id. at 91.
96
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penological interest, the Court cited prison officials’ testimony
that mail between prisoners could be used to arrange attacks,
escapes, gang affiliations, and the like. 104 The Court observed
that the restriction was logically connected to legitimate security
concerns in general prison administration and not content
based. 105
Addressing the second and third factors, the Court briefly
noted that the limitation on inmate-to-inmate correspondence did
not necessarily limit freedom of expression, as prisoners were
still able to exercise their First Amendment rights through
correspondence with non-inmates. 106 Furthermore, the Court
recognized that if the letter writing were allowed, the negative
impact on prison administration would be too burdensome.
Citing the “potential [of a] ‘ripple effect’” from one prison to
another, 107 the Court concluded that it was much more
hazardous to allow the letter writing than to limit it.
Finally, the Court noted that the prisoners challenging the
regulation had failed to point to any “obvious, easy

104

Id. Confirming the logic behind the prohibition on letter writing, the
Court pointed to similar restrictions that kept inmates or former inmates from
communicating with one another, such as after one is released on parole. Id.
at 92. Additionally, the Court noted a Missouri prison policy of keeping
inmates separate so as to reduce gang association amongst inmates. Id. at 92.
These goals could only be furthered by the restriction on inmate-to-inmate
correspondence. Along these lines, the Court also emphasized that the
regulation only prohibits such conduct between prisoners at other Missouri
correctional institutions. Id.
105
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1987).
106
Id. One could also assume that communication could occur during
contact visits or phone calls. Notably, the Court did not spend sufficient time
worrying about alternatives for prisoners to express themselves, and turned to
address the impact of allowing the right on the prison. Id. at 91-92.
107
Id. Here, the Court focused on the impact of allowing letter writing
between prisoners, forcing prison officials to read every letter and to excise
any dangerous content. Id. Noting that this would impose significant costs on
the prison system and would present the risk that staff would not be able to
catch certain coded messages, the Court affirmed that the alternative was
insufficient at reaching the penological goal. Id.
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alternatives.” 108 Although the plaintiffs had suggested that
inmate-to-inmate communications be monitored or read by
prison administrators instead, the Court quickly dismissed that
idea as “impos[ing] more than a de minimis cost on the pursuit
of legitimate corrections goals.” 109 Furthermore, the Court noted
the skepticism of prison officials in making such an alternative
work, as it would be more difficult to read and monitor
prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence, citing the possibility that
dangerous messages could escape detection through gang-related
codes. 110 The Court concluded that the limitations on prisoner
correspondence were fully justified and did not violate prisoners’
First Amendment rights. 111
If the limitation on inmate correspondence were the only
regulation called into question in Turner, it is likely that the
Court’s overall analysis would have been exceedingly
deferential. Indeed, much of the Court’s decision was based on
prison officials’ testimony and the possibility of negative
consequences if the right to correspond were allowed. 112
Accepting these conjectures at face value, the Court
demonstrated its trust of officials in calculating and responding
to probable harms. The Court’s deference, however, did not
extend to the restriction on the right of inmates to marry.
Addressing the ban on inmate marriage, the Court scrutinized
the regulation’s paltry justifications, and concluded that such an
overbearing restriction was an unconstitutional limitation on the
fundamental right to marry. 113
Examining the reasoning behind the marriage restriction, the
Court ridiculed the security concerns expressed by prison
officials, including the claims that “love triangles might lead to
violent confrontations between inmates,” and that female
prisoners needed to be kept away from certain types of men and

108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987).
Id. at 106 n.5
Id. at 97-100.
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encouraged to seek healthier relationships. 114 The Court found
that the regulation was over-reaching, pointing to viable
alternatives that would allow inmates to marry while still
ensuring prison security. 115 The claim that female prisoners’
rehabilitation would be aided by a restriction on marriage was
dismissed outright. 116 There was no legitimate penological
interest, nor was the restriction at all rationally related to the
proffered goal. 117 The regulation could not pass muster under
the first prong of the Turner test and so the ban on inmate
marriage was struck down without further review. 118
The Court’s decision in Turner was not unanimous. In
dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the new framework espoused
by the majority was useless: “if the standard [could] be satisfied
by nothing more than a ‘logical connection’ between the
regulation and any legitimate penological concern perceived by a
cautious warden, it is virtually meaningless.” 119 Emphasizing its
absurdity, Justice Stevens claimed that the test would permit a
warden’s mere imagination to establish legitimate security
concerns. 120 Arguably, the test would allow far reaching
anticipatory restrictions because Turner did not require evidence
or even a suggestion of need. 121

114

Id.
Id. The Court noted 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986), a federal prison
regulation that permitted inmate marriage unless a warden had cause to
believe the marriage would otherwise threaten the security of the prison or
the general public safety. Turner, 482 U.S. at 98.
116
Id. at 98-100.
117
While recognizing the need to regulate the particulars of marriage
ceremonies in prison, the Court noted that “the almost complete ban on the
decision to marry is not reasonably related to legitimate penological
objectives.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 99 (1987).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
120
Id. at 100-01.
121
Id.
115
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II. TURNER APPLIED
Part I of this Comment traced the evolution of standards for
First Amendment challenges to prison regulations. Part II
reviews a sampling of specific First Amendment prisoner cases
concerning restrictions that limit prisoners’ access to books,
magazines, and other reading materials. At first glance, the
Turner test appears fair, favoring deference to prison officials,
while still weighing the importance of prisoners’ rights. In fact,
the four-factor analysis was undertaken with ease by various
lower courts. The following discussion concerns several
instances in which restrictions on prisoners’ First Amendment
rights were upheld under the Turner framework.
A. Thornburgh v. Abbott 122
Abbott involved a challenge to prison restrictions on
incoming publications for inmates. 123 Pursuant to Federal
Bureau of Prison regulation 28 C.F.R. § 540.71, wardens were
authorized to reject incoming publications if they were deemed
to be “detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of
the institution or if [they] might facilitate criminal activity.”124
Though the right to receive publications was not entirely
restricted, it was severely limited in certain situations. 125
Distinguishing the new test, the Court stressed that, unlike

122

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
Id.
124
Id. at 403 n.1. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2007), wardens may
reject books, single issues of magazines or newspapers, or other print
materials based on the objective of enforcing security and order, and
suppressing criminal activity. To ensure the wardens follow protocol, §
540.71 provides a “non-exhaustive list of criteria” to base rejection on.
Abbott, 490 U.S. at 405. Furthermore, if the published material is part of a
subscription, the warden must review each issue independently. 28 C.F.R. §
540.71(c) (2007). Finally, the regulation requires the warden to provide
procedural safeguards so that the First Amendment rights of prisoners and
senders are not violated. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2007).
125
Abbott, 490 U.S. at 404.
123

ANNA.DOC

7/1/2007 10:58 PM

PRISONERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

1245

Procunier, the framework in Turner did not require a “least
restrictive means” test. 126 Recognizing that Turner involved
deference to prison officials, the Court extended its application
to “regulations affecting the sending of a ‘publication’ to a
prisoner.” 127
Applying the Turner factors, the Court emphasized that
prison officials were particularly well-situated to determine
which publications might create upset amongst inmates. 128
Following, the Court noted that it was “comforted by the
individualized nature of the determinations . . . [as] under the
regulations, no publication may be excluded unless the warden
himself makes the determination.” 129 Accordingly, the Court
found the restrictions legitimately connected to the goal of prison
security, neutral in content, and rationally related to the
proffered objective of maintaining safety and order. 130
Moreover, the Court found that alternative avenues for prisoner
expression remained open as inmates were still allowed access to
unobjectionable publications. 131 The restriction was “limited to
those [publications] found potentially detrimental to order and
security,” and was necessary to avoid a “‘ripple effect’”
amongst other inmates and prison officials. 132 Finally, no easy
alternatives had been presented or discussed by the inmates
challenging the restriction. 133 Upholding the restrictions, the
Supreme Court reinforced its ruling in Turner and extended its
rationale to the area of prisoners’ access to certain publications.
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Stevens remained
focused on the flaws inherent in the structure of the Turner
standard 134 and reiterated his contention that the standard was

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 411.
Id. at 413 (internal citations omitted).
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989).
Id. at 416.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 418.
Id.
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 420-34 (1989).
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virtually meaningless as it barely questioned the reasoning
behind the publication restrictions. 135 Stressing dissatisfaction
with the final prong of the test, the inquiry into alternatives,
Stevens pointed to clear alternatives, 136 like clipping the
offensive materials out of publications before giving them to
prisoners. 137 Citing to a portion of the record in which an expert
witness in the field of corrections admitted that there was no real
security risk with such an alternative, 138 Stevens rejected the
consideration of administrative convenience. 139
B. Thompson v. Campbell 140
Similarly, Thompson v. Campbell also involved restrictions
on prisoners’ incoming reading materials. 141 Three restrictions
were in question: first, prisoners could not receive mail that
advocated anarchy or contained “obscene or sexual content;” 142
second, they could only receive books, magazines, or

135

Id. at 434.
Id. at 432-33.
137
Id. at 431.
138
Id. Specifically, Stevens urged that “a review of the record reveals
that the Court thus defers to ‘findings’ of a security threat that even prison
officials admitted to be nonexistent.” Id. at 432. In his footnote 17, Stevens
provided actual questions and answers from trial testimony involving an
expert in the field of corrections. The expert stated that he personally felt that
cutting out the offensive portions of material “smacks of what goes on in
fascist countries and is not a very attractive solution to me,” but provided no
argument that anyone other than administration would feel so uncomfortable
with the situation. Id. at 433 n.17. Rather, the expert conceded that it “would
not prevent a security threat to cut out the page if there was nothing else in
[the material that was restricted].” Id. The expert then emphasized that the
real benefit behind total censorship of questionable material was to ease
administrative burdens, as no prisoners could criticize or challenge the
process of what would be cut out versus what would be allowed. Id.
139
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 434.
140
Thompson v. Campbell, 81 FED App. 563 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, Thompson v. White, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3102 (U.S., Apr. 26, 2004).
141
Thompson, 81 FED App. At 564-65.
142
Id.
136
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newspapers sent directly from publishers; 143 and third, they
were prohibited from receiving bulk rate mail. 144 While serving
his life sentence in a Tennessee correctional complex, Harold
Thompson was denied access to his incoming reading materials
at least two dozen times, mostly due to “anarchist content.” 145
Prison officials asserted that the regulations were necessary to
maintain order and security. 146
Applying the Turner framework, the Sixth Circuit addressed
the first regulation, against reading materials involving anarchy
or sexual content. 147 Noting the goal of prison security, the
court affirmed that the regulation was neutral and necessary to
maintain safety and promote rehabilitation. 148 Even without
proof that possession of the materials caused problems amongst
inmates or in the prison, the court plainly stated that its only
concern was “whether a reasonable official might think that the
policy advances these interests [of security].”149 It seemed quite
clear to the court that deference was appropriate, as allowing
materials that promoted anarchy and deviant sexual behavior in

143

Id. at 565.
Id. Bulk-rate mail is also known as standard-rate mail, and refers to a
type of mail sent with a lower postage cost. Generally, when a large number
of essentially identical items must be sent out for business purposes, they will
be sent as bulk-rate mail. Items such as newsletters, bulletins, catalogues,
fliers, circulars and advertisements are all sent bulk-rate. United States Postal
Service, Business Mail 101, http://www.usps.com/businessmail101/classes/
standard.htm (last visited April 20, 2007); http://www.usps.com
/businessmail101/getstarted/bulkMail.htm (last visited April 20, 2007).
145
Thompson, 81 FED App. at 564-65.
146
Thompson v. Campbell, 81 FED App. 563, 565-67 (6th Cir. 2003).
147
Id. at 567-68.
148
Id. at 567. The regulation explicitly banned materials that would
“pose a threat to institutional security,” and that could “reasonably be
considered to advocate, facilitate, or otherwise present a risk of lawlessness,
anarchy or rebellion against government authority.” Id. at 564-65 (internal
citations omitted). This included not only anarchy-based materials, but also
sexually themed photographs, pictures, drawings, or reading materials that
would in some way encourage criminal sexual deviance amongst prisoners.
Id. at 565.
149
Id. at 567.
144
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prison was antithetical to maintaining order. 150
Under the second Turner factor, the court confirmed there
were certainly alternative means for prisoners to exercise their
First Amendment rights, as prisoners were still able to access
various publications. 151 Considering the third factor and the
possible impact on the prison if the prohibited materials were
allowed, the court noted the likelihood of a broad ripple
effect. 152 Although there was no proof that Thompson himself
would rise up against prison officials or engage in deviant sexual
acts if permitted the materials, the court emphasized that it could
not ignore the possibility that other prisoners might also gain
access to the questionable materials. 153 Ultimately, the court
concluded that Thompson had failed to suggest any workable
alternatives, and that the regulation, therefore, did “not
represent an ‘exaggerated response to the problem at hand.’” 154
The court affirmed the constitutionality of the restrictions as
the policy of prohibiting certain materials was logically
connected to maintaining order, alternative means of reading
remained open, and there were no other ways to advance the
same goals. Regarding the other two regulations in question, the
publisher-only rule and ban on bulk rate mail, the court simply
invoked precedent under Bell v. Wolfish and Sheets v. Moore, 155
upholding both of these restrictions as well.156

150

Id.
Id.
152
Thompson v. Campbell, 81 FED App. 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2003).
153
Id.
154
Id. Although Thompson did suggest that prison officials only allow
him the specific reading material, and that he would promise not to distribute
it to other prisoners, the court noted that such an alternative would either
require prison administrators to believe Thompson’s word, or “devote
considerable resources to verifying that he is keeping his word.” Id. at 568.
155
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979) and Sheets v. Moore, 97
F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 1996).
156
As Bell addressed the permissibility of a publishers-only rule, and as
Sheets found a ban on bulk rate mail constitutional, the court found no need
to apply Turner to these restrictions.
151
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C. Willson v. Buss 157
In Willson, an inmate was denied access to certain special
interest magazines to which he had subscribed, including The
Advocate and Out, both categorized as homosexual lifestyle and
interest magazines. 158 However, neither publication contained
“sexually graphic material,” only articles that would be of
special interest to homosexuals. 159 Pursuant to prison
procedures, any incoming publication that was deemed obscene,
“blatant[ly] homosexual,” or that “jeopardize[d] the safety,
security, or orderly operation of [the] facility” could be
restricted. 160
Applying Turner, the district court found that the purpose of
the restriction was to “keep out of the prison anything that
would lead a prisoner to believe another prisoner was
homosexual.” 161 Prison administrators feared that an inmate in
possession of such material would be “targeted for sexual
gratification, other physical abuse, and extortion.” 162 While
acknowledging that attitudes toward homosexuality had changed
with time, and that homosexuality received protection under
privacy rights through Lawrence v. Texas, 163 the court made it
157

Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2005).
Id. at 784.
159
Id. Out and The Advocate were characterized by Willson as the
“homosexual version of People and Newsweek, respectively.” Id. Out
advertises itself as “a gay and lesbian perspective on style, entertainment,
fashion, the arts, politics, culture, and the world at large.” Out Magazine,
http://www.out.com (last accessed April 20, 2007). Conversely, The
Advocate boasts its “award-winning [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender]
news site.” The Advocate, http://www.advocate.com/index.asp (last accessed
Dec. 4, 2006). Willson did not complain about his inability to read specific
articles, but about the general denial of these magazines that cater to
homosexual interests in entertainment, politics, culture, and world events.
160
Willson, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (referring to Westville Correctional
Facility General Rules and Procedures, 2002 § XII(D)).
161
Id. at 785.
162
Id.
163
Indeed, the Court noted that the shame and illegality of homosexual
behavior emphasized in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) “was put
158
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clear that the issue at hand was not the prisoner’s right to be
homosexual or to engage in homosexual acts, but rather to
protect the safety and welfare of the inmate in possession of the
materials. 164
Under the first prong of Turner, the court deferred to prison
officials, finding the interest in protecting inmates legitimate and
the regulation rational. 165 Citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, the court
noted that it was not “necessary to show that materials are
‘likely’ to lead to violence, but rather, it is sufficient to show
that in the absence of the regulation a potential danger would
exist.” 166 Arguably, there was no way to stop the magazines
from circulating once inside the prison, and so it was possible
that anyone in possession of the homosexual magazines could be
targeted for additional violence or extortion, thereby increasing
the potential danger. 167 Finally, the court found that, although
to rest” in Lawrence, but that the present case had less to do with the
illegality of homosexuality as an act, and more to do with prisoners safety.
Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 784, 785 (N.D. Ind. 2005). In Lawrence,
the Supreme Court extended the right of privacy to consensual homosexual
acts, noting that:
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity
as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in
a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). The Court then
contrasted the magazine regulation, demonstrating that the concern was
not that inmates would find consensual romantic partners in prison, but
rather that inmates would be targeted, blackmailed, raped, or the like if
their fellow inmates knew of their sexual orientation. Willson, 370 F.
Supp. 2d at 785-86.
164
Willson, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
165
Id. at 787-90.
166
Id. at 788 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989).
167
Id. at 788-89. Noting that the Ninth Circuit explicitly found that
being identified as a homosexual in prison threatened prison safety because it
could lead to violence against those with homosexual reading material.
Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1989). In Harper, the
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the regulation was focused on restricting homosexual materials,
it was content neutral. 168
Addressing the second Turner factor, the court dismissed the
importance of alternative means for the inmates to access
homosexual-related reading materials in light of the importance
of the security rationale. 169 Similarly, the court did not spend
much effort on the third factor, finding the same safety concerns
and difficulties would result if the prison were forced to
accommodate the prisoners’ desire for such material. 170
Finally, under the fourth Turner factor, the court reviewed
the inmate’s suggested alternative that the magazines be
prohibited from common areas, but allowed in private cells,
thereby decreasing the possibility that the magazines would be
passed around and lead to violence against those in
possession. 171 The suggestion was, however, quickly dismissed
as “sexual items, including those promoting homosexual
activity” were already prohibited from use or display in common
areas. 172 Noting that the proposed alternative would do nothing
to prevent the labeling of those in possession of the magazines,
the court found the threat of violence remained and accordingly
affirmed the constitutionality of the regulation. 173
As demonstrated through Abbott, Thompson and Willson,
courts at all levels have found that the Turner test provides a
workable balance between prisoners’ First Amendment rights
and the needs of prison administrators. These cases demonstrate
a clear penological interest in prohibiting prisoners from having
prisoners challenged a ban on mail from the North American Man Boy Love
Association (NAMBLA). Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized safety concerns
were well founded as “inmates who are identified as or suspected of being
pedophiles or homosexuals are a favorite target for violence since many
incarcerated felons were sexually abuses as children.” Willson, 370 F. Supp.
2d at 781 (citing Harper, 877 F.2d at 730, 733).
168
Willson, 370 F. Supp. at 789.
169
Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 782, 790 (N.D. Ind. 2005).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 790-92.
173
Id. at 791.
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deviant or disruptive materials, recognizing the possible harm
that would result if prisoners were allowed access. Be it the
possibility of violent outbreaks as in Abbott, chaos or sexual
deviance as in Thompson, or inciting harassment and violence as
in Willson, the regulations were justified by the need of prison
officials to protect inmates and to avoid future harm.
III. DECONSTRUCTING BEARD V. BANKS
The first and second parts of this Comment illustrated the
formulation of the standard of review in cases concerning
prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Part III examines the
background of Banks and addresses the reasoning behind the
Supreme Court’s decision to apply Turner so deferentially.
Section A focuses specifically on the Court’s analysis of the
regulation, and highlights the deferential and detached review
under the four-factor test. Section B then examines the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Banks.
In Banks, the Court found a rational relationship between the
goal of prisoner safety and rehabilitation, and the resulting
restrictions on reading materials and personal photographs. 174 In
its application of Turner, however, the Court arguably failed to
truly scrutinize the restrictions under the third and fourth
prongs, 175 resulting in something more akin to automatic
deference than judicial review. Though the Turner factors
appeared to be clear, concise and fair, as Abbott, Thompson, and
Willson demonstrate, the Supreme Court’s decision in Beard v.
Banks suggests that either Turner’s usefulness has been
exhausted, or that any regulation could pass the test if its basis
is rational. By misapplying Turner and failing to establish the
validity of the justifications behind the regulation, the Supreme
Court opened the door for confusion as to how future courts
should apply, or even consider, Turner.

174
175

Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (2006).
Id. at 2580
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A. The Total Misapplication of Turner
Like Abbott, Thompson and Willson, the recent case of
Beard v. Banks involved restrictions on prisoner access to
certain publications. 176 Yet, unlike previous cases, the
regulations in Banks were not justified by safety or necessity,
but instead by the need to rehabilitate prisoners. 177
Banks involved a Pennsylvania state prison restriction that
prohibited inmate access to newspapers, magazines, and personal
photographs. 178 The ban only affected inmates housed in the
most restrictive level of the prison, Long Term Segregation Unit
(“LTSU”), Level 2. This unit held the most contentious
prisoners—individuals categorized by one or more of the
following: “assaultive behavior;” “causing injury to other
inmates or staff;” engaging in disturbing behavior; possessing
weapons; a history of escape attempts; or “being a sexual
predator.” 179 Upon entering the prison, all inmates were initially
assigned to Level 2. 180 Thus, the restriction applied to all
inmates at one time or another, regardless of behavioral
problems. Inmates remained in Level 2, subject to the
restrictions unless, after 90 days, prison administrators believed
the inmate worthy of a less restrictive level. 181 As noted by the
Court, however, in practice, most inmates never graduated to a
different level. 182 Despite the restrictions, all inmates were
allowed “legal and personal correspondence, religious and legal
materials, two library books, and writing paper.” 183
176

Id. at 2572.
Id. at 2578.
178
Id. at 2576.
179
Id. Some of the other factors include “failure to complete the SMU
[Special Management Unit] program. . . engaging in facility disturbances;
belonging to an unauthorized organization or Security Threat Group;
engaging in criminal activity that threatened the community. . . exerting
negative influence in facility activities.” Id.
180
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2576 (2006).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 2577.
177
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The challenge to the regulation was brought by Ronald
Banks, a prisoner in LTSU Level 2, against the Secretary of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Jeffrey Banks. 184
Justifying the restrictions, the Secretary claimed (1) the “need to
motivate better behavior on the part of particularly difficult
prisoners,” (2) the need to minimize the amount of material in
prisoner cells, and (3) prison safety. 185 Upon review, however,
the Supreme Court only addressed the first justification, finding
it to be a “legitimate penological objective” and rationally
connected to the restrictions, thereby satisfying the first Turner
factor. 186 As prisoners were left with so little personal property
or freedom in Level 2, the Court reasoned that the regulation
was effective in depriving the inmates of “virtually the last
privilege left,” providing an incentive for better behavior. 187
Addressing the second Turner factor, the alternative means
for the prisoner to exercise the restricted right, the Court found
simply that there were none. 188 Citing prison statistics, 189 the
Court noted that while, after 90 days, prisoners could be moved
and granted limited access to newspapers and magazines, 190 only
approximately one out of four inmates ever actually graduated to
a less restrictive level. 191 Though previous applications of
Turner suggested that the absence of any alternative would
“provide evidence that the regulations [were] unreasonable,” 192

184

Id.
Id. at 2578.
186
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579 (2006).
187
Id. at 2579.
188
Id. at 2579-80.
189
To illustrate the restrictions on prisoners, the Court noted that the
LTSU is one of three special units in the Pennsylvania prison system meant
for the most difficult prisoners, “the commonwealth’s most incorrigible,
recalcitrant inmates.” Id. at 2576. These special units restrict the majority of
prisoner activity. There are approximately forty inmates within the LTSU,
and all inmates are initially placed in Level 2 of the LTSU. Id.
190
In Level 1, prisoners are allowed one newspaper and five magazines,
but still no personal photographs. Id. at 2577.
191
Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579.
192
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006) (citing Overton v.
185
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the Court in Banks emphasized that the lack of any alternative
means of access to newspapers, magazines, and personal
photographs was not determinative and that the restrictions
were, nonetheless, reasonable.193
There was no further discussion of the second Turner factor.
Although Turner emphasized that alternatives should be
considered, the Banks court gave no rational or insight into its
judgment. 194 While in theory the second Turner factor balances
deference to prison officials with the need to protect prisoners
from total deprivation, in Banks, application of the second factor
was brief, overly deferential, and without real consideration of
other alternatives. 195
Evaluating the potential impact on the administration and
other prisoners under the third Turner prong, the Court again
provided simple, deferential review. 196 Curtailing access to
newspapers, magazines, and photographs provided incentive for
prisoners to adhere to prison policy. 197 Notably absent is any
discussion of the possible “ripple effect” that removing the
restriction would cause. This stands in contrast to the Court’s
analysis of the restrictions at issue in Willson, Thompson and
Abbott. 198 In those cases, lifting the restrictions would have
affected the prison community as a whole. In Banks, however,
the only impact would be a reduction of incentives to behave
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003)).
193
Id. at 2580.
194
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 87, 90 (1987).
195
Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579-80. Truly, discussion of the second factor
was limited to one paragraph, simply noting that while there were no
alternatives, it did not conclusively mean the regulation was not rational or
reasonably related to the goal of the prison administration.
196
Id. at 2580.
197
Id.
198
In Willson, Thompson, and Abbott, the Court scrutinized the impact
of allowing the right, whether it was the personal safety of other inmates,
safety of the prison environment, or the possibility of violence and
harassment. Because allowing the restricted reading material in Willson,
Thompson, and Abbott would clearly create or exacerbate problems in prison
administration and general safety, the impact of allowing the restricted
reading material was simply too great to allow.
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better. 199
Addressing the final Turner factor, the Court again noted
that because the restriction was based on policy ideals, there
were simply no viable alternatives or less restrictive ways to
accomplish the goals. 200 Recognizing that its application of the
second, third, and fourth factors was circularly deferential,
based on the rehabilitation goals of the Secretary, the Court
justified its behavior by noting that these factors did little to add
to “the first factor’s basic logical rationale.” 201 Rather, it
suggested that balancing the factors took a back seat to
determining “whether the Secretary [had shown] more than
simply a logical relation, that is, whether he [had shown] a
reasonable relation.” 202 This, perhaps, was the Court’s way of
saying that the Turner test, in fact, was not satisfied, or that the
four-factor test was simply inapplicable in a situation in which
the goal was rehabilitation—a goal that does not necessarily
allow for alternative avenues of expression.
Citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 203 the Court opined that there
was truly no other way to “induce compliance with the rules of
inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who have
few other privileges to lose.” 204 The Banks Court found that the
199

Ironically, the reward incentive of depriving prisoners of access to
these materials did not even appear effective in the first place. According to
prison statistics already referenced by the Court, only approximately one in
four inmates were ever rehabilitated enough to leave Level 2 and graduate
into better circumstances. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2590 (2006).
Furthermore, all inmates were initially placed into Level 2, so there was no
way to keep track of if and how this specific regulation on its own was
impacting inmate behavior. Id. It perhaps belabors the point to emphasize that
if the worst of the worst are being contained in Level 2, there is little chance
that merely depriving them from personal photographs or newspapers would
encourage a total turnaround in behavior.
200
Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2580.
201
Id.
202
Id. (emphasis in original).
203
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
204
Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2580 (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 134). In
Overton, the Court upheld visitation restrictions on prisoners who violated
prison substance abuse guidelines. The restrictions required that all visitors be
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restrictions as issue, like those in Overton, were aimed at a
discrete set of individuals, and had resulted from the
professional judgment of prison administrators. 205
Furthermore, the Supreme Court dismissed outright the
Third Circuit’s analysis and ultimate rejection of the restriction,
noting that the lower court placed too much of an evidentiary
burden on the Secretary. 206 While the court below was
concerned with whether the restrictions would actually be
effective in modifying behavior and “whether the deprivation
pre-approved by the prison administration, included family and ten other
visitors, but that no children under the age of eighteen could be on the list
unless they were somehow related to the prisoner. Overton, 539 U.S. at 129
(2003). However, if the prisoner was guilty of multiple prison violations,
visitation privileges were restricted to attorneys and religious leaders. Id. at
130.
205
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006).
206
Id. at 2581. The Third Circuit expressed hesitation regarding the
rehabilitation justification. While agreeing that “deterrence of future
infractions of prison rules can be an appropriate justification for temporarily
restricting the rights of inmates,” the court was not satisfied that the
regulations actually served the purpose. Beard v. Banks, 399 F.3d 134, 14041 (3rd Cir. 2005). If the restrictions were placed on prisoners for limited
amounts of time, whenever prisoners were shown to violate rules or
regulations, then surely the restrictions could pass as a way to encourage
better behavior. Id. at 141. However, the court noted that because the
prohibition would likely not have a great impact on inmate behavior, in light
of all the other restrictions imposed on prisoners, “the relationship between
the policy and the penological interest may be too attenuated to be
reasonable.” Id. at 144. Emphasizing that the prisoners were not requesting
“unlimited access to innumerable periodicals,” the court was at a loss in
distinguishing how writing paper and religious texts could be differentiated
and assumed to be any less of a security threat. Id.
In his dissent, Judge Alito recognized that the uncertainty surrounding
how, when or why an inmate may be transferred out of Level 2 could impact
“the degree of the incentive,” it did not follow that “the incentive is wholly
destroyed.” Id. at 149 (Alito, J., dissenting). Additionally, Alito argued that
the Turner test had never required evidentiary proof of the effectiveness of
regulations, finding that “the entire system of prison discipline might be
imperilled [sic] if each sanction for prison misconduct could not be sustained
without empirical evidence that the sanction provided some incremental
deterrent.” Id.
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theory of behavior modification had any basis in real human
psychology, or had proven effective with LTSU inmates,” 207 the
Supreme Court emphasized the need for deference. 208
Accordingly, the Court upheld the regulations. 209
B. Deprive and then Make Better: Concurring and
Dissenting Justices Emphasize the Faulty
Rehabilitative Reasoning of Banks
The Court’s decision in Banks was not unanimous. 210 Both
concurring and dissenting justices chastised the majority’s quick
approval of the rehabilitative goals of the Pennsylvania system,
and fast and loose application of Turner.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas pointed out that perhaps
the reason the majority had such a difficult time applying the
Turner factors was due to the fact that the Turner framework
was not developed with regulations “that seek to modify inmate
behavior through privilege deprivation” in mind. 211 Rather,
Justice Thomas stressed the fact that in application, such
rehabilitative regulations will, without a doubt, pass muster
under the first factor of reasonableness, but will necessarily fail
under the second. “Such policies, by design, do not provide an
‘alternative means’ for inmates to exercise the rights they have
been deprived.” 212 As to the third and fourth factors, Justice
Thomas noted that there was truly no reason to evaluate whether
the regulation was impinging on prisoner rights if the goal of
rehabilitation was being fulfilled. 213
Delving further into the majority’s flawed reasoning, in his
dissent Justice Stevens addressed the fact that while the
207

Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 140-141 (3d Cir. 2005).
Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2581.
209
Id. at 2582.
210
Id. at 2582-93 (2006). Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in the
judgment of the case, while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. Id.
211
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2584 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
212
Id.
213
Id. at 2585.
208
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Secretary presented several penological reasons for the
restrictions, the majority only addressed one—that of
rehabilitation. 214 Concentrating on the other proffered
justifications for the regulation, Stevens pointed to the
Secretary’s contention that the regulation was necessary in order
to limit the amount of materials an inmate could have in his
cell. 215 Referencing the record below, Stevens noted that each
inmate was allowed a variety of materials in his cell, including
bedding, toilet paper, writing paper, envelopes, socks,
underwear, religious newspapers, Bibles, a lunch tray, plate and
cup. 216 Any of these items, Stevens argued, could easily be used
to start fires, throw feces, and create other dangerous situations,
all of which prison administrators noted were of concern in
enacting the regulation. 217 As such, he posited, this aspect of the
Secretary’s justification for the restriction could not be deemed
logical, as the restricted newspapers, magazines and personal
photographs would not likely exacerbate the cluttered
environment of the prison cells. 218
Justice Stevens also noted that the method and nature of the
majority’s review provided no limit on prison regulations or
general deprivation where rehabilitation was concerned.219 He
argued that such a justification had no stopping point: “if
sufficient, it would provide a ‘rational basis’ for any regulation
that deprives a prisoner of a constitutional right so long as there
is at least a theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain the

214

Id. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2586-87.
216
Id. at 2586.
217
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2586 (2006).
218
Emphasizing the tenuous logical connection, Stevens referred to a
prison official’s deposition that conceded inmates could always use what they
were allowed in their cells to misbehave in the way prison officials feared.
Id. at 2587. Specifically, in Superintendent Dickson’s deposition, he admitted
that inmates could easily start fires with the allowed writing paper and
bedding, and could easily throw feces and urine with the cup inmates were
provided with in their cells. Id.
219
Id. at 2588.
215
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right at some future time by modifying his behavior.” 220
Furthermore, Justice Stevens called attention to the fact that if
the Court could always view deprivation for rehabilitation as
rational, the Turner test would effectively be obviated. 221
To ensure that rehabilitation would not be used to justify all
limitations on prisoners’ rights, Justice Stevens underscored the
need for more review and less deference to prison officials. 222
Even if there were a bare “logical connection to
rehabilitation . . . prison officials are not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” 223 Furthermore, in light of the other
restrictions placed on inmates in the LTSU Level 2, Stevens
emphasized that there already were great incentives for prisoners
to behave better with the hope of graduating into a less
restrictive level. 224 Moreover, because prisoners were never
given access to personal photographs, even if they did graduate
to Level 1, there was a clear indication that the regulation was
in fact an exaggerated response to prisoner behavior. 225 Plainly,
the deprivation was not linked to any need for rehabilitation, as
there were already restrictions accomplishing the objective. 226
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg also emphasized the
220

Id.
Id. In making his point, Justice Stevens invoked the marriage
regulation challenged in Turner. If the denial of marriage could also have
been justified on a rehabilitation basis, Stevens emphasized that the Court
would have likely let the regulation stand, even though, under Turner, the
very same court focused on the illogical justification behind the regulation.
Id.
222
Id. at 2588-89.
223
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2588-89 (2006). Indeed, one of the
most disturbing aspects of Banks may be that the case was decided on
Beard’s motion for summary judgment. See id. at 2576.
224
Id. at 2589. In addition to the restrictions on newspapers, magazines
and personal photographs, inmates in Level 2 were also not allowed to watch
television or listen to the radio, cannot use the commissary, cannot earn the
GED or “special education study,” will not receive compensation for work
done in the unit as a janitor, and are confined to solitary confinement 23
hours a day. Id. at 2589.
225
Id. at 2589-90.
226
Id.
221
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faulty rehabilitation theory. 227 Criticizing the deference
employed by the majority, she noted that the evidence and
justifications provided by the Secretary would “justify virtually
any prison regulation that [did] not involve physical abuse.” 228
Drawing on Turner, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that if the
logical connection between the regulation and the goal was “so
remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational,” then the
regulation must be struck down. 229 Arguably, it was irrational to
deprive inmates of knowledge about current events like
Hurricane Katrina or the Iraq war because they still had access
to other publications, such as the “Jewish Daily Forward,” as it
was a religious publication. 230 Stressing the importance of
evidentiary testimony in analyzing the reasonableness of the
regulation, Ginsburg noted that much information was left to be
desired. 231
Indeed, Justices Thomas, Stevens and Ginsburg all
recognized the inappropriateness of Turner’s application in
Banks. At the very heart of Turner is an attempt to balance
deference with protection, and because the prior applications of
Turner involved maintaining prison safety as the ultimate goal,
the question became: should Turner still be applied in situations
in which the ultimate goal of prison administrators is a vague
notion of rehabilitation?
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: RECALIBRATING THE DEFERENCE
Parts I, II, and III of this Comment provided a substantial
background in case law involving prisoners’ First Amendment
rights, illustrating how courts analyze and balance the interests
involved, and further examined the loose application of Turner
227

Id. at 2591-93.
Id. at 2592.
229
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2593 (2006).
230
Id. Referencing current events of the time, Justice Ginsburg was
drawing on the fact that prisoners were prevented from reading newspapers
or magazines and thereby prevented from following news stories that not only
affected the country, but which had international significance as well.
231
Id.
228
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in Banks. Part IV suggests alternatives to the Court’s approach
and use of Turner in situations in which rehabilitation is offered
as an ultimate justification.
There are many definitions of rehabilitation, including: “to
restore to a former capacity,” 232 “to restore or bring to a
condition of health or useful and constructive activity,” 233 and
“preparation for release back into society.” 234 While the
American correctional system is primarily focused on deterring
and punishing criminal behavior, 235 prisons of course may still
provide or require programs that encourage behavioral
reform. 236 Yet, if a rehabilitative program deprives prisoners’ of
First Amendment rights, but does not even attempt to justify the
deprivation as necessary to address a specific behavioral
problem, there is cause for concern.
In Banks, prison administrators never claimed that the
inmates in Level 2 of LTSU had abused privileges for certain
reading materials, 237 or that their crimes were somehow
232

Merriam-Webster’s
Online
Dictionary,
http://www.mw.com/dictionary/rehabilitation (last accessed April 20, 2007).
233
Id.
234
Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
235
See generally, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of
Prison (Editor Vintage Books 1995) (1979).
236
As the Supreme Court noted in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002),
rehabilitation is a valid objective of correctional facilities as “most offenders
will eventually return to society.” Id. at 36. In McKune, the Court addressed
the constitutionality of sexual abuse treatment programs and policies for
prisoners who were convicted of sex-based crimes. Id. If the prisoners
refused to participate in the rehabilitation program, they could be denied
certain privileges including visitation rights, television, and working
opportunities. Id. at 24. Recognizing that sexual offenders were more likely
than any other offender to engage in similar crimes, the Court recognized that
deprivation for the sake of rehabilitation may be justified if the deprivation
relates to the prisoner’s specific conviction. Id. at 32-35. See also, King v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing
administration could rightfully deny prisoner access to a book if the book
would encourage the same deviate behavior that prisoner was incarcerated
for).
237
See Brief of Petitioner at 4, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006)
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connected to the prohibited newspapers and magazines. Nor was
any evidence provided to support the contention that deprivation
of the items would actually motivate better behavior. 238
Prisoners were already placed in solitary confinement for 23 out
of 24 hours a day, denied television and radio, and were
prevented from earning their GED or taking special education
classes. 239 Upon close examination, the regulation at issue looks
more like intensive punishment rather than a motivational
tactic. 240 Surely the measures already in place are incentive
enough. Then again, only one out of every four inmates in Level
2 improves his behavior enough to be moved into Level 1, 241
indicating that the theory behind depriving the prisoners rights in
order to encourage better behavior is actually without any
evidentiary support. Even the use of the word “rehabilitation” in
this context smacks of irony. If a prisoner is kept in Level 2 for
the term of his sentence, and denied access to news or current
events, it is likely is that he will re-enter society at a distinct
disadvantage. 242 Surely total social isolation does not foster any
(No. 04-1739).
238
In fact, administrators only claimed that the prisoners were difficult
to handle and that therefore further deprivation would provide general
deterrence. Id.
239
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2589 (2006).
240
Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739).
241
Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2576.
242
Indeed, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936),
the Supreme Court emphasized the important role of newspapers and
magazines in informing the public as to national affairs. Id. at 250. Because
these forms of media provide the public with a universe of information about
their government, newspapers and magazines are the ultimate tool for
individuals to engage in political discourse and provide “restraints upon
misgovernment.” Id. Furthermore, in Banks v. Beard, below, the Third
Circuit noted a similar irony in the use of the deprivation as a means for
rehabilitation, noting that “rehabilitative goals are ‘furthered by efforts to
inform and educate inmates, and foster their involvement in the world outside
the prison gates.’” 399 F.3d 134, 142 (citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754
F.2d 1015, 1034 (2d Cir. 1985)). The court also referenced the negative
psychological impact that may result in prisoners who are deprived access to
reading material. Banks, 399 F.3d at 142 (citing Spellman v. Hopper, 95 F.
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legitimate rehabilitative goals.
Because the rationale behind the restriction in Banks is vague
and overbroad, the Court’s application of Turner provokes
concern, suggesting any regulation could be justified as
rehabilitative in nature. To ensure that this does not happen, and
that prisoners retain their fundamental First Amendment rights,
there must be less deference from the courts. Rather, Turner
should be applied with an exacting eye, allowing for balance
between the respect and trust owed to administrators who best
know the system, and the importance of prisoners’ rights.
Courts would do better to remember Turner’s predecessor,
Procunier v. Martinez, and to scrutinize the justifications behind
all-encompassing regulations, ensuring they do not go further
than necessary.
When the Turner test was applied in Banks, there was clear
friction between the first part of the test and the other three. 243
Because the first factor inquires as to rationality, the connection
between the regulation and a legitimate penological interest, the
justification of rehabilitation passes without much scrutiny. 244 As

Supp. 2d 1267, 1281 (M.D. Ala. 1999)).
243
Banks, 126 S.Ct. at 2579. This was indeed explicitly recognized by
the majority:
In fact, the second, third, and fourth factors, being in a sense
logically related to the Policy itself, here add little, one way or
another, to the first factor’s basic logical rationale . . . The fact that
two of these latter three factors seem to support the Policy does
not, therefore, count in the Secretary’s favor. The real task in this
case is not balancing these factors, but rather determining whether
the Secretary shows more than simply a logical relation, that is,
whether he shows a reasonable relation. We believe the material
presented here by the prison officials is sufficient to demonstrate
that the Policy is a reasonable one.
Id. (emphasis added).
244
As noted in Abbott, Thompson and Willson, infra, Part II, so long as
prison administrators were able to justify a regulation as addressing security
concerns, courts generally accepted the interest and application as plainly
rational. Because rehabilitation is recognized as one of the objectives
correctional facilities, it too serves a rational purpose. See McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (finding rehabilitation serves a valid goal by
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illustrated in Banks, however, because rehabilitation is such a
weighty goal, the Supreme Court found it requires only a logical
relation to the regulation, 245 rendering the remaining three
factors useless. 246
If, however, the first factor were applied with less deference
at the outset, the Turner test could still successfully be applied in
cases such as Banks. The first Turner factor is intended to
address the need for logic, 247 and the Supreme Court should
have truly examined the logic behind the regulation and
scrutinized its tailoring. Under such critical analysis, it is likely
that the ban on newspapers, magazines and personal photographs
would have failed constitutional scrutiny, due to the lack of a
reasonable relationship, and thus would not have passed the first
prong of Turner.
A restriction should not be looked at in isolation, but must
be considered in light of the prison system and other regulations
as a whole. 248 While, at face value, the ban on certain reading
materials may appear logical, (in the sense that deprivation could
encourage better behavior), a general awareness of how Level 2
functions illustrates how the regulation at hand is anything
but. 249 Moreover, while the possibility of rehabilitative
programs was once heralded by the prison community, the
general idea that harsh treatment of prisoners will deter and
rehabilitate them has been questioned by recent studies. 250
reshaping offenders before they return the general society).
245
Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2579 (2006).
246
Id.
247
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 78, 81-82 (1987).
248
See infra, Part IC, discussion of the second Turner factor.
249
Coupled with the pre-existing regulations against telephone calls,
television, radio, commissary, and solitary confinement, it is illogical to
conclude that an additional restriction on reading materials would really be
the straw the broke the camels back. It is illogical to conclude that the
additional deprivation would be the serum to change prisoners’ ways.
250
See Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at *19, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No. 04-1739)
(referencing M. Keith Chen and Jesse M. Shapiro, Does Prison Harden
Inmates? A Discontinuity-based Approach (2005), http://www.som.yale.edu/
Faculty/keith.chen/papers/prison072405.pdf at 1 (“harsher prison conditions
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Even if a denial of prisoners’ First Amendment freedoms
was justified by rehabilitative goals, and seen as logical,
rational, and reasonable, the Court’s constitutional analysis
should not stop there. The deferential nature of the Turner test
should be further checked by an inquiry into whether the
regulation goes too far, particularly in the present instance,
where the justification of rehabilitation is all encompassing. This
idea was first put forth in Procunier v. Martinez 251 and is
echoed in sentiment in the second and fourth parts of the Turner
test. 252 Yet, when the second and fourth factors of Turner were
applied in Banks, the overwhelming rehabilitative justification
seemed to swallow their impact and importance. 253
To counteract this result, a court must push further. A
restriction that deprives prisoners’ fundamental right to read
must be looked at with a narrowed eye. 254 Here, even under the
are associated with significantly more post-release crime”)).
251
While developing the standard in Procunier, the Court noted that it
was necessary for prison administrators not only to justify regulations, but
that they must also “show that [the] regulation . . . furthers one or more of
the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.”
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). This emphasis on the need
to actually show a relationship between the means and the goal was coupled
with the Court’s requirement that the limitation “must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved.” Id. If the restriction was therefore supported by a valid goal but
“its sweep [was] unnecessarily broad,” the Court would find it went too far.
Id. at 414.
252
Because the second part of Turner focuses on the available
alternatives that prisoners have to express their rights, and as the fourth
prong seeks to ensure that the regulation is not an exaggeration in scope, it is
clear that Turner is concerned with whether prisoners’ rights are protected
from overbearing regulations. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.
253
This is only emphasized by the fact that the Court explicitly
recognized that it was not concerned with balancing the various parts of
Turner. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579-80 (2006).
254
The basic civil right of prisoners to be able to read and stay informed
as to national events is indeed well recognized by both federal and state
prison regulations. The federal Bureau of Prisons explicitly recognizes that
prisoners “have the right to a wide range of reading materials for educational
purposes and for your own enjoyment. These materials may include
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rehabilitative standard, it is clear that the regulation does go too
far. There is no proof that the regulation improved the one out
of four passing rate from Level 2 to Level 1, nor are prisoners
afforded alternate access to the materials in question. Unlike the
regulations at hand in Willson, Abbott, and Thompson, safety is
not the real issue. 255
As Banks was decided in a recent term, public
acknowledgment or backlash is yet to be seen regarding the
permissibility of such broad restrictions on prisoners’ First
Amendment rights. 256 Nonetheless, so long as the reasoning in
magazines and newspapers sent from the community, with certain
restrictions.” See 28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (2007). Although the Supreme Court,
and courts across the country, have previously found that this right to read
certain materials is not unlimited, a complete and total ban on certain reading
materials is very rare. See Brief for the ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at *18, Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006) (No.
04-1739), at *21 (referencing Corrections Compendium, High Level Security
Inmates, September 2003, tbl. 4 (only three out of forty-one prisons surveyed
only allow high security prisoners access to books alone)). Additionally, as
noted in Procunier, California Penal Code Section 2600 also recognizes the
importance of the bare fundamental right of prisoners to read and stay
informed about current events. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 403, n.6. Specifically,
the California Penal Code ensures prisoners that they will not be deprived
essential civil rights such as the right to “purchase, receive, and read any and
all newspapers, periodicals, and books accepted for distribution by the United
States Post Office.” Cal. Penal Code s2600.
255
The goals put forth in Banks “includ[ed] the need to motivate better
behavior on the part of particularly difficult prisoners, the need to minimize
the amount of property they control in their cells, and the need to assure
prison safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of material a prisoner
might use to start a cell fire.” Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2579. So although prison
officials offered safety as one of the rationales, the Court never actually
addressed the safety concerns, perhaps because they were irrational in light of
all of the other permissible items that prisoners were allowed to have in their
cells. Id. at 2586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256
While it cannot be discounted that there are state penal codes like that
of California, see, supra n.254, which seek to ensure that prisoners retain
some of their basic civil rights as far as reading materials are concerned, the
holding in Banks suggests that the states need not worry themselves over
affording such protections. Being that the restriction in Banks was approved
by the Supreme Court, it may actually become less likely for states to initiate
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Banks stands without revision or input from local legislatures or
prison administration, the pleasantry of “rehabilitation” will
allow punishment in disguise. Merely calling torture
“rehabilitation” could reassure a reviewing court that deprivation
of fundamental rights is a necessary, positive step. When the
next inevitable challenge to prison regulations arises, the
reviewing court will have to decipher what the Supreme Court
was truly saying in Banks. Unless and until local authorities step
in to raise the bar in the treatment of prisoners’ First
Amendment rights, we will have to wait for the Court to clarify
how far is too far. The Court must recognize the impact of its
decision, increase the scrutiny established in Procunier, and
ensure we go no further than necessary in the denial of
fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION
As part of their punishment, prisoners cannot expect that
they will retain all constitutional freedoms. Yet, we pride
ourselves as a country that still recognizes prisoners have certain
inalienable rights, like the right to marry, to read, or
communicate with others. As such, we carefully monitor how
and why and when inmates are deprived of their First
Amendment freedoms; our courts formally recognize the need
alternative means of expression if one form is denied. 257
Over the years, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test
to analyze challenges to prison regulations that are considered
too extreme in the deprivation of certain rights. 258 When the test
was first enunciated in Turner, and later applied in subsequent
cases, it proved to be effective in weighing and balancing the

similar forms of protection for their inmates if such protection is not seen as
essential.
257
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987) (noting that if
alternative means remain open for the prisoners to exercise the same right,
then the Court may be more deferential to prison administrators and their
justifications of the restriction in question).
258
See, supra, Part I.
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competing interests of prisoners and administrators. 259 The test
respected the need for prisoners to express themselves, while
also recognizing the challenges in running correctional facilities.
However workable the Turner test first seemed, it is no
longer. When applied in Banks, it became all too obvious that
the current Supreme Court did not want to get involved in
overseeing prison administrators or setting limits to correctional
theories. 260 By accepting Pennsylvania’s prison regulation
prohibiting LTSU Level 2 inmates from having access to
newspapers, magazines and personal photographs, the Supreme
Court manipulated Turner to reach its desired outcome. Once
the Court was told that the regulation was instituted for a
rational purpose, it glossed over the significance of the other
factors at play. 261 Disposing of Turner’s balancing test, the
Court provided unprecedented deference in light of the serious
deprivation involved. Accepting the administrations’ justification
that prisoners should have limited access to reading materials to
encourage better behavior and reduce the threat of violent or
destructive behavior, the Court rolled over, leaving room for the
great possibility that any fundamental right could be acceptably
denied if justified by rehabilitation.
In light of the freedoms involved, and the deprivations
already imposed on prisoners, there must be a change in the way
in which such regulations are reviewed. If the purpose behind a
regulation is said to encourage rehabilitation, or justified because
of its theory that deprivation makes one better, the reviewing
court must ask for clear correlation between purpose and effect.
Further, there must be increased scrutiny to ensure the
regulation does no more than what is absolutely necessary to
accomplish the stated goal. Otherwise, simply justifying any
restriction as rehabilitative could easily lead to a system where
259

See, supra, Part II.
See Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2580-82 (2006) (finding that the
evidentiary burden of the justification was met even though the Secretary had
only submitted a statement and deposition in support of the regulation).
261
See id. at 2580 (admitting the second, third and fourth factors were
irrelevant so long as policy is deemed logical and whether means show
reasonable relation).
260
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prisoners retain no fundamental rights. While continuing to
respect prison administrators and their intimate knowledge of the
system, if the connection between the regulation and the desired
effect is too attenuated, deference should not overwhelm our
better judgment. However, until the Supreme Court again has
the opportunity to address such concerns and to recalibrate the
weighing of deference against rationality, local legislatures,
prison administrators, and the public should expect more: that
the most fundamental rights remain respected, regardless if we
are criminal or not.

